Recent financial changes in Western Germany by Henry K. Heuser
REGENT FINANCIAL CHANGES IN WESTERN GERMANY
1
After heavy reliance on foreign assistance
in the postwar period, Western Germany
after 1951 began to accumulate monetary
reserves in the form of gold and foreign ex-
change, and also to provide credit to many
of its trading partners. This improvement
in Western Germany's international position
was accomplished within the framework of
a rising standard of living, progressive aboli-
tion of direct controls, and over-all financial
stability.
Wholesale prices and the cost of living at
the end of 1953 were both somewhat lower
than in mid-1951, that is to say, at the end of
the last 12-month period when Western Ger-
many had a foreign deficit on current ac-
count. Fluctuations during the intervening
period were very small. After rising sub-
stantially in the first year after the outbreak
of war in Korea, wholesale and consumer
prices continued to rise very slightly for some
time, remained practically constant through-
out calendar year 1952, and then declined
about 3 per cent in 1953.
This large measure of internal financial
stability was maintained over a period when
Western Germany's foreign position on cur-
rent account shifted from deficit to surplus
by an amount equivalent to about half the
value of the country's private investment in
plant and equipment in 1953. There was a
concurrent shift of the same order of mag-
nitude, also from deficit to surplus, in
the balance of the current payments and
receipts of the government sector with the
1This article was prepared by Henry K. Heuser, Chief of
the Central and Eastern European Section of the Board's Divi-
sion of International Finance. Presentation and analysis owe
much to the methodology developed in recent years by the
Central Planning Bureau of the Netherlands and the Neder-
landsche Bank.
private sector and foreign countries. And,
while the value of total supplies—domestic
output and imports—was almost a third
larger in 1953 than in the 12-month period
ending June 1951, domestic use of such sup-
plies had expanded by little more than one-
fourth.
These developments suggest that, broadly
speaking, internal financial stability in West-
ern Germany was maintained during the
past three years because the effects of two
major financial changes—the shifts from
deficit to surplus on both foreign and gov-
ernment accounts—served as offsets to each
other. Such an interpretation assumes that,
in the absence of a government surplus, pri-
vate spending would have been greater
rather than private borrowing less.
To recognize that the effects of two major
financial forces offset each other and thus
helped to maintain internal financial sta-
bility does not advance the explanation of
stability very far. It would seem worth-
while, therefore, to explore in some detail
the train of causation in the stabilizing proc-
ess; to ask which of the two forces was the
originating and which the reacting one at
different times during the period.
Examination of major economic changes
over the period seems to support the view
that it was the development of a slack in
domestic demand relative to productive ca-
pacity that twice served as the originating
factor in the process of mutual offsetting by
different forces. This was near the begin-
ning (second half of 1951) and again toward
the end of the period (latter part of 1952 and
the first half of 1953). Rising net exports
appear to have been the originating factor
during the middle of the period (most of
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1952) and perhaps once more at the very end
(second half of 1953).
In the last few years monetary policy was
applied in a manner to meet three different
types of conditions. When, as in 1950-51,
it was imperative to restrain domestic de-
mand in an effort to maintain external sol-
vency, monetary policy was restrictive. As
the need for restriction began to recede in
mid-1952, monetary policy responded with a
gradual reduction in the cost of central bank
credit. Finally, with the further restrictive
effects of growing government surpluses
about balanced by the expansionary forces of
rising net exports during much of 1953,
monetary policy remained largely neutral,
permitting internal financial stability to be
maintained by existing forces.
NOTE ON METHOD
In examining the factors that may have
been responsible for the shifts in the dis-
tribution of Western Germany's rising out-
put among the domestic private sector, the
TABLE 1
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS IN THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY, 1953 AND 1950-51
Western Germany and West Berlin









Nonfinancial sources, net (foreign balance on current account
for domestic economy)
2 3.9 -1.5 3.5 -0.6 0.5 -0.9
Disposable income plus capital consumption allowances...
Gross national product receipts
National income and net national product receipts
Capital consumption allowances
Government transfers and interest
Contribution to social insurance, net
Personal and business direct taxes and related payments....
































































































Total, above net sources of funds
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Changes in holdings of domestic liquid assets:







Total, above net uses of funds
2
 6







































9.4 4.7 4.0 0 6 5.4 4.1
*Residual. 1 Excludes banking system.
2 Details may not add to totals because of rounding.
3 Consumption by public sector equals current expenditures (all expenditures except transfers to private sector, investment, and
redemption of government debt). 4Less than 50 million deutsche marks.
^Errors and omissions in the balance of payments are included in figures for private sector.
foreigners' holdings of deutsche marks are included under domestic economy holdings and not shown as rest-of-the-world holdings.
They are therefore also reflected in domestic economy borrowings from the rest of the world.
Sources.—Bundesministerium fuer Wirtschaft, Deutsches Institut fuer Wirtschaftsforschung, Bank deutscher Laender, Berliner
Zentralbank.
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public sector, and exports, this analysis makes
use of an experimental technique. The un-
derlying principle of this technique is an at-
tempt to trace simultaneously, but as separate
quantities, the development of incomes, bor-
rowings, and liquid assets. This is accom-
plished by means of a statistical framework
that combines national accounts and mone-
tary information in consistent statements, as
in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1 presents the transactions of the
domestic economy (excluding the banking
system) broken down into a public and a
private sector. Table 1 is not a complete sys-
tem of accounts. Table 2 completes the sys-
tem of accounts by integrating statements for
the domestic banking system and the rest of
the world with a summary of the transactions
of the domestic economy.
The price paid for the degree of condensa-
tion in Tables 1 and 2—and it rises as the
statement consolidates different economic
groups into fewer and fewer sectors—is the
concealment of financial or other economic
relationships which may provide clues in the
search for causal connections between past
events. At this point of development, con-
clusions drawn are necessarily subject to this
limitation. Awareness of this possibility
should permit the advantages of this presen-
tation to outweigh its shortcomings.
It is likely that, as the method of presenta-
tion is increasingly tailored to fit specific
country situations, the risk of its hiding sig-
nificant movements will decrease. Analysis
from a distance, however, always runs the
risk of arriving at conclusions that may be
considered odd by informed observers or
policy makers on the spot. It is hoped that,
even where findings may be questioned, the
TABLE 2
FLOW OF FUNDS AMONG DOMESTIC ECONOMY, BANKING SYSTEM, AND REST OF THE WORLD
Western Germany and West Berlin
[In billions of deutsche marks]
Sources and uses of funds
Nonfinancial sources of funds, net (foreign balance on current
account) .
Domestic exports of goods and services
Domestic imports of goods and services
Borrowing, net
3 . . .
From domestic economy
From domestic banks
From rest of the world (including grants)
4
Total, above net sources of funds
 5
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Changes in holdings of gold and dollars
















































































2Signs from point of view of rest of the world.
3For the domestic economy and domestic banks, plus implies increase in liabilities or decrease in assets; minus implies decrease in
liabilities or increase in assets.
4 Includes changes in net short-term foreign exchange holdings other than dollars.
8Details may not add to totals because of rounding. Also, see note 6, Table 1.
6Plus implies decrease in liabilities or increase in assets; minus implies increase in liabilities or decrease in assets.
Sources.—See Table 1.
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route by which they were reached may never-
theless be of interest to those more familiar
with the sequence of events.
From a time analysis standpoint, the rele-
vant comparisons are between two separate
periods: 1950-51 as approximately the last 12
months when Western Germany and West
Berlin had a deficit on foreign account, and
1953 as the most recent 12-month period for
which the material essential for a financial
analysis is available.
ALLOCATION OF PHYSICAL RESOURCES
The value of total supplies, that is, of
domestic output plus imports, was about
32 per cent (22 per cent in 1953 prices)
larger in 1953 than in 1950-51. The value
of domestic output had risen about 33 per
cent and that of imports about 30 per cent,
as shown in Table 3. To achieve the im-
provement of nearly 5.4 billion marks (1.3
billion dollars) in the foreign position on
current account, it was necessary for West-
ern Germany to reduce slightly the propor-
tion of total supplies used at home. The in-
crease in total supplies, while sufficient to
TABLE 3
SUPPLY AND USE OF RESOURCES
1
Western Germany and West Berlin




























































xFor sources see Table 1.
2 Calendar year.
3The 12-month period ending June 1951.
4Details may not add to totals because of rounding.
permit the value of resources used domesti-
cally to grow by about 27 per cent, was not
large enough to prevent a decline of nearly
4 per cent in the relative share of domestic
uses in total supplies. The relative share of
exports in total supplies rose by more than
33 per cent from 1950-51 to 1953, with their
value up more than 75 per cent.
The slower rate of increase in the domestic
use of resources concealed the increase in
the public sector's relative share in total
supplies, which rose by 15 per cent. The
share of the private sector fell about 8 per
cent. This decrease occurred at a time when
direct domestic controls had been largely
abolished and when import restrictions were
being progressively relaxed. Since total sup-
plies available to the private sector were
rising despite the decline in its share, the
standard of living rose: Annual per capita
consumption is estimated to have increased
from 1,380 marks to 1,580 marks, or from
the equivalent of about $330 to $375, from
1950-51 to 1953.
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
A comprehensive review of sources and
uses of funds provides a framework within
which it is possible not only to analyze the
effects of changes in the relationship between
income and expenditures of one sector on the
income of other sectors but also to check the
total net sources of funds for each sector
against its total net uses of funds. The avail-
ability of such a check should reduce the risk
of misinterpretation of the effects of fiscal
and monetary policy.
To maintain internal financial stability in
Western Germany, the effects of fiscal meas-
ures—planned as well as unplanned—seem
at one time to have operated as an influence
counteracting the unstabilizing effects of de-
velopments in other sectors, and at another
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time to have stood in need of being at least
partly offset themselves. In the final anal-
ysis, however, it would seem that the re-
luctance with which fiscal policy responded
to unplanned surpluses with reduction in
taxes stood general financial policy in good
stead. Restrictive fiscal policies in the past
may well have furthered the progressive
strengthening of general confidence by their
very cautiousness.
Monetary policy, especially in the latter
part of the period, when market forces were
offsetting each other and resulting in high-
level equilibrium at home and solvency
abroad, appears to have neither strongly en-
forced nor appreciably weakened any spe-
cific financial trend.
TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF NET SOURCES AND NET USES OF FUNDS
1
Western Germany and West Berlin





Domestic gross product expenditures. . .
Financial sources, net
Borrowing from domestic banks
Borrowing and grants from abroad
4....
Total, above net sources
5




































1For sources, derivation, and sector breakdown, see Table 1.
2 Calendar year.
3The 12-month period ending June 1951.
4See note 6, Table 1.
6Details may not add to totals because of rounding.
In both the public sector and the private
nonbank sector, disposable income rose more
than expenditures from 1950-51 to 1953; in
other words, there was an increase of what
in this article are called net nonfinancial
sources of funds, as is shown in Table 4.
There was no decline in net bank credit
to the private sector. In the private and
public sectors taken together, net financial
sources of funds, that is, borrowing from
foreign countries (including grants) as well
as from domestic banks, declined somewhat.
Changes in the distribution of net uses of
funds—various types of bank deposits, cur-
rency, and holdings of short-term govern-
ment paper—reflected in a general way the
shift from deficit to surplus in the public
sector and also an increase in personal saving.
Net nonfinancial sources. Net nonfinan-
cial sources of funds for the domestic econ-
omy are equal to the sum of the net nonfinan-
cial sources of funds for the public and private
sectors. For each of these, the net nonfinan-
cial source of funds in this article is the
difference between the sector's disposable in-
come plus capital consumption allowances
and its purchases of final product from the
private sector and foreign countries. For the
domestic economy as a whole, this difference
is the foreign balance on current account (ex-
cluding grants), transactions within the
domestic economy having dropped out as a
result of consolidation.
In 1953, net nonfinancial sources for West-
ern Germany were 5.4 billion marks larger
than in 1950-51, as reflected in the shift from
a 1.5 billion mark deficit on foreign ac-
count in 1950-51 to a surplus of 3.9 billion in
1953. Both domestic sectors moved from
over-all deficit to over-all surplus, the private
sector by 1.4 billion marks and the public
sector by a shift of 4.1 billion (Table 1).
In Western Germany, foreign transactions
on current account (excluding grants from
abroad) are negligible for the public sector
but sizable for the private sector. Hence the
shift of the private sector from deficit to sur-
plus had no contracting effect on the public
sector's income, as it would have had if
changes in private expenditures had affected
only payments to the public sector. As it
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was, the private sector's shift to surplus was
the result of an improvement of 5.4 billion
marks in the sector's balance with foreign
countries and a change of about 4 billion
from surplus to deficit in the balance with
the public sector.
On the other hand, the shift from deficit
to surplus for the public sector, since it im-
pinged directly only on the domestic econ-
omy, tended to have a restraining effect on
the private sector's disposable income. Cur-
rent revenues in the form of taxes and re-
lated payments rose by nearly 14 billion
marks against increased purchases of goods
and services of 10 billion.
Monetary and fiscal policies. Keeping
domestic demand in check was not, except
at the beginning, a necessary aim of mone-
tary policy during the larger part of the
period under consideration. In an effort to
correct the balance-of-payments difficulties
which had resulted primarily from inventory
purchases after the outbreak of the Korean
War, credit was tightened from the fall of
1950 to the early spring of 1951 through a
rise in the discount rate, higher reserve re-
quirements, and ceilings on short-term loans.
From May 1952 until mid-1953, however, the
discount rate was lowered four times and
reserve requirements were reduced three
times. The decline in the private sector's
demand relative to its disposable income is
not readily explained by changes in monetary
policy, except that the previous rigorous use
of monetary policy gave confidence that this
instrument of public financial policy would
be used, if necessary, to safeguard the value
of the mark. Monetary policy in this way
contributed to the climate of financial con-
fidence so essential in fostering a flow of
private savings.
Fiscal operations on the other hand appear
to have played an important role in keeping
domestic demand in check. Gross receipts
of the public sector were about 55 per cent
greater in 1953 than in 1950-51, compared
with an estimated increase of about 33
per cent in the value of national output. The
rise in gross receipts resulted in part from
an increase in taxation enacted in July 1951;
in part it was brought about by an increase
in taxable income and transactions as na-
tional output grew. In 1953 taxes were
reduced but the change probably did not
affect receipts until the last quarter of the
year.
There is no certainty as to the amounts
by which private consumption or investment
might have risen had not the increase in
private disposable income been restrained by
taxation. Consumption would almost cer-
tainly have been somewhat greater, and prob-
ably investment also. Balance, instead of a
surplus, on government account would have
tended to result in a greater demand some-
where—either the public sector would have
raised its expenditures to the level of its reve-
nues and thus increased its own demand for
resources, or a reduction in tax collections
down to the level of public expenditures
would have led to an increase in the demand
of the private sector. The restraint on de-
mand exerted by fiscal policy may have
been greater, especially toward the end of
the period, than was required for the main-
tenance of internal financial stability. But
had there been no restrictive effects of fiscal
policy during 1951 and 1952, monetary policy
would have been confronted by a far differ-
ent task.
Net financial sources. For the domestic
economy, net borrowing from the banks
and net borrowing from abroad (including
grants and short-term capital movements)
are designated in this article as financial
sources of funds; for individual sectors, long-
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term borrowing from each other is shown
with financial sources in Table 1, but changes
in short-term lending between nonbank sec-
tors are shown with other uses of funds for
acquiring liquid assets.
The private sector's net borrowing from
domestic banks expanded as much in 1953
as in 1950-51. The shift from deficit to sur-
plus on private nonfinancial account was not
associated with a lower level of net borrow-
ing from the banks, as might have been the
case had business borrowers not expected a
continued upturn of domestic economic ac-
tivity. In the public sector the main changes
in net financial sources were the lower level
of foreign aid and the related decrease in
the flow of funds from the public sector to
the commercial banks.
The shift from deficit to surplus for the
private sector of the Western German
economy hides the decrease in saving by busi-
nesses which is estimated to have occurred
between 1950-51 and 1953 (Table 5). It
would have been surprising, therefore, if
private net borrowing from the banks had
been less in 1953 than in 1950-51, in view of
probably optimistic expectations in 1953 as a
whole. Gross bank loans to the private sector
in 1953 exceeded the level in 1950-51 by about
the estimated increase in private investment.
Total domestic net borrowing from the
banks was greater in 1953 than in 1950-51
but this was due entirely to a decline in pub-
lic funds put at the disposal of the commer-
cial banks from nearly one billion marks in
1950-51 to virtually zero in 1953—largely
because the flow to the Federal Government
of Marshall aid counterpart funds, formerly
passed on to the banks for limited periods,
had declined to an amount far below its
volume in 1950-51.
The principal change in nonbank net
financial sources, that is, in long-term bor-
rowing by sectors from each other and
from foreign countries (including foreign
grants) was a decline in foreign aid. For
the public sector this decline was made up
only in part by a small increase in its long-
term borrowing from the private sector.
Saving and investment. The public sec-
tor provided much the greater part of the
increase in total saving required to offset
the expansionary impact of rising net exports
and domestic investment (Table 5). Saving
by all public agencies (excess of revenue from
taxation and similar current receipts over
expenditures for all current purposes) is
estimated to have been about 10 billion marks
in 1953 as compared with slightly more than
3 billion in 1950-51.
Private saving rose by 2.5 billion marks
compared with the 7 billion increase in public
saving. More than half of the estimated
increase in saving by households appears to
have been offset by lower retained earnings
by businesses. The share of households in
national income was considerably larger in
TABLE 5
NET SAVING AND INVESTMENT ACCOUNT
Western Germany and West Berlin








































1 Details may not add to totals because of rounding.
2 Difference between disposable income and consumption. See
Table 1 for basic figures.
3 Ratio between saving by businesses and saving by households
as estimated for Western Germany by the Deutsches Institut fuer
Wirtschaftsforschung was applied to total private saving for West-
ern Germany and West Berlin as estimated from material of
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1953 than in 1950-51, a development which
helped to raise personal saving as national
income grew. On the other hand, business
saving appears to have been adversely affected
in 1953 by the tendency of wage costs to
rise and of producers' gross returns to fall
or at least to rise less.
Net financial uses of funds. Nonfinancial
sources of funds less expenditures plus net
financial sources as used in this article are
equal to net changes in liquid asset holdings,
that is, to net changes in demand and time
and savings deposits, currency, and short-
term lending between sectors. Changes in
these liquid assets are designated as net finan-
cial uses.
In Western Germany the changes from
1950-51 to 1953 in net financial uses of
funds as defined in this article reflected in
a rough general way the shift from deficit
to surplus in the public sector as well as the
higher level of saving by the household
group of the private sector. Total deposits
of public authorities, including an estimated
change in their savings deposits, rose by 3.6
billion marks in 1953, compared with an
estimated increase of around 0.4 billion in
1950-51. A large part of the increase in
public deposits is reported to have repre-
sented funds made available by the German
authorities to the occupation forces but not
spent. Total savings deposits, which in 1950-
51 rose by only 0.4 billion marks, increased
by 4.0 billion in 1953.
The principal factors that led to a greater
increase in cash resources in Germany in
1953 than in 1950-51 are summarized in
Table 6. They were a large rise in the an-
nual increase in official gold and dollar re-
serves and a moderate rise in domestic bank
credit expansion. The 3.8 billion mark im-
provement in 1953 of the net foreign asset
position of the banking system, as compared
with an unchanging position in 1950-51,
reflected the shift in Western Germany's
balance of payments. Net credit by the bank-
ing system to the private sector did not show
an increase since there was an offsetting rise
from 1950-51 to 1953 in the annual volume
of funds flowing into commercial banks in
exchange for bonds issued by these banks in
an effort to attract money to be used for long-
term investment.
TABLE 6
CONSOLIDATED CONDITION STATEMENT OF THE
BANKING SYSTEM
Western Germany and West Berlin
[In billions of deutsche marks]
Changes
Changes in net assets, total
Credit to the domestic economy, net ....
Public sector. . . .
Private sector
Increase in gold and dollar reserves
Less: net change in other foreign
liabilities (decrease —)









































1Less than 50 million deutsche marks.
2 Details may not add to totals because of rounding.
Sources.—Bank deutscher Laender and Berliner Zentralbank.
Net uses of funds other than changes in
bank deposits appear to have moved in the
same direction as the bilateral balance of
payments and receipts between the public
and private sectors. Thus, as is shown in
Table 1, the private sector's net short-term
claims on the public sector declined twice
as much in 1953, when the public sector had
a surplus, as it did in 1950-51, when the
public sector had a deficit with the private
sector.
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CONCLUSIONS
This article provides no objective proof
that in the last few years a growing govern-
ment surplus and rising net exports served
as offsets to each other in Western Germany.
There is a strong presumption, however, that
total demand would have been greater in the
absence of a rising government surplus.
With a lower level of taxation, private con-
sumption would have tended to be greater.
The disposable income of households would
have tended to rise more than the net earn-
ings of businesses since the larger part of
taxes is probably paid directly or indirectly
by households. At the same time it is prob-
ably more difficult for households to make
up for a lower current income by increased
borrowing from the banks. In addition,
business borrowing might well have been
larger rather than smaller in the absence of
a government surplus.
Internal financial stability, therefore, was
probably maintained by a process in which
opposite financial forces offset each other.
The offsetting process did not consist in a
cancelling of the over-all deficit of one sector
against an over-all surplus of the other—in
this case there could have been no foreign
deficit or surplus—but rather in the effects
of shifts in bilateral balances between the
public and private sectors and, in principle,
in the bilateral balance of each with foreign
countries.
According to whether one sector rather
than another operated as the originating
factor in the stabilization process, the span
of time reviewed in this article may be
divided into at least three separate periods.
There were two periods when a weaken-
ing of domestic demand relative to produc-
tive capacity appears to have been the origi-
nating factor. The first of these covered the
second half of 1951 when Western Ger-
many's foreign position began to shift from
deficit to surplus. Domestic prices at that
time rose by about 2 per cent. Without the
favorable response by net exports to what
must have been at least moderately depressive
effects of restrictive monetary and fiscal poli-
cies, the predominating influence on prices
at that time might well have been down-
ward rather than upward.
The second time when domestic down-
ward pressures on prices seem to have been
at least in part offset by rising net exports
was the first half of 1953. According to in-
formed German observers, domestic demand
at that time failed to rise with the increase
in productive capacity, especially in the capi-
tal goods industries. An increase in the ratio
of the value of foreign to total transactions
lends support to this view. Without a con-
tinued increase in net exports, domestic prices
might well have fallen more than they did.
Even with an export surplus at the 1953
annual rate, and assuming no change in
monetary policy, only part of the surplus on
government account was probably needed in
the first half of 1953 to maintain financial
stability. Without a 2.5 billion mark in-
crease (annual rate) in the surplus of the
government sector from 1952 to the first half
of 1953, compared with a rise (annual rate)
in net exports of about 1.5 billion, demand
would probably have risen. The increase,
while it might have prevented prices from
falling in the first half of 1953, possibly
would not have been enough to force a rise.
In at least one period, and perhaps two,
assuming no change in monetary policies,
it was necessary for a growing surplus on
government account to counteract what
might otherwise have become an unduly
expansionary influence of growing net ex-
ports. The first of these periods covered most
of 1952. There was a 22 per cent rise in the
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average value of German export goods be-
tween 1950-51 and 1952, suggesting that net
exports, rather than requiring domestic en-
couragement as in 1951, would have risen
even without restrictive policies at home. If
not offset by some decline in domestic de-
mand, this increase would have tended to
exert an unopposed upward pressure on
domestic prices. There was progressive re-
laxation of restrictive monetary measures
from mid-1952 on, implying that the au-
thorities were relying on the restrictive in-
fluence of growing public surpluses to pre-
vent the upward movement in German prices
—slight at that time—from becoming exces-
sive.
The slackening of domestic demand in
relation to rising productive capacity, ob-
served in the first half of 1953, did not con-
tinue in the second half of the year. It is
possible, therefore, that domestic prices
would have risen at that time instead of
fallen, if there had been no surplus what-
ever on government account, unless mone-
tary policy had once more become restrictive.
Favorable events as well as policy played
a part in maintaining financial stability under
conditions of a large shift in the balance
of payments. The continued growth in the
public sector's surplus was not planned as
an offset to the expansionary effect of rising
net exports; a large part of it would not have
emerged had expenditures risen as originally
envisaged. Policy, however, both fiscal and
monetary, played a major part in 1951 in
initiating the process of improvement in the
balance of payments. While this improve-
ment under cautious fiscal policies turned out
to exceed the needs of a restoration of ex-
ternal solvency, a more rapid relaxation of
fiscal restrictiveness might not have been
appropriate at a time when restoration of
confidence was still an important task of
financial policy. After 1951, when strong
forces in opposite directions tended to offset
each other and to produce stability at a high
level of output, monetary policy served the
interests of such stability best by neither
strongly enforcing nor appreciably weaken-
ing the power of these forces.
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